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I.   Introduction:  The Uniform Law Commission and its Work 
 
The Uniform Law Commission [ULC] (formerly the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [NCCUSL]) was founded in 1892 to work for 
uniformity in state laws. It is an organization composed chiefly of retired lawyers, law 
professors and judges who serve specific terms and receive no compensation for their time. 
The only requirement is membership in the bar. The National Conference meets for one 
specific purpose – to achieve uniformity in state laws by drafting proposals for uniform and 
model laws, and then working for the laws’ enactment in their respective state legislatures.  
While the organization has drafted more than 200 uniform laws in areas such as 
probate, child custody, partnership and family support, its signature accomplishment is the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The development of the UCC was instigated in 1940 and 
conducted for ten years until adoption by the Commission. The Act’s subsequent adoption 
across the states was ushered in over a fourteen-year period. Currently UCL has working 
groups studying consumer leasing law, estate tax and tort liability apportionment, health care 
law, mediation, and other areas.   
Of potential interest to forensic economists are the three recently approved 
recommendations: 1) for the management of employee retirement systems [Uniform 
Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (1997), UMPERS], 2) for custodial 
trustees [Uniform Custodial Trust Act (1987), UCTA], and 3) for investment practices of 
fiduciaries [Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994), UPIA]. All three of these pieces of model 
legislation contain language relating to the investment decisions of a trustee. An example is   2
from the UCTA:   “…the custodial trustee shall observe the standard of care that would be 
observed by a prudent person dealing with property of another.” 
The language of UMPERS is more to the point:  
…modern portfolio theory strongly supports a diversification requirement…. 
the premise of the subsection is that [retirement plan] participants are better 
protected by the Act’s emphasis on close attention to risk/return objectives, 
than in attempts to identify categories of investment that are prudent or 
imprudent per se [emphasis added]. 
 
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA hereafter) is most revealing of the general 
current of these model laws. UPIA undertakes to update the law of trust investment to reflect 
changes in investment practice that have accompanied new empirical and theoretical 
knowledge about the behavior of capital markets. The Act seeks to bring trust investment law 
under the influence of what is know as “modern portfolio theory”. The Prudent Investor Act 
has been enacted in 43 states
1 as of this date (see the NCL website).   
There are a number of passages of the model Act that reveal its orientation but its 
essential goal is to allow modern trust fiduciaries to: 
1.  delegate detailed investment and management decisions to specialists; 
2.  consider for purposes of assessing prudence, the entire portfolio rather than 
individual investments; 
3.  consider the risk-return tradeoff in forms of investment; 
4.  consider all different types of investment and not be subject to “categorical” 
prohibitions; 
5.  seek diversification as part of the very definition of “prudent” investing. 
 
The Act requires that the trustee exercise due standards of care but under Section 2 
(“Standards of Care”) states that a trustee should  “invest and manage trust assets as a prudent   3
                                                                                                                                                                                     
investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other 
circumstances of the trust.” (UPIA, section 2 (a) p. 5). The Act goes on to confront the “risk-
return” tradeoff.  
Returns correlate strongly with risk, but tolerance of risk varies greatly with 
the financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the case of a trust, 
with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the 
beneficiaries. A trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of 
modest means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a 
young scion of great wealth. (Section 2, comment, p. 7) 
 
Regarding diversification, the Act goes beyond permitting it to actually requiring it, quoting a 
rational from a recent finance text: 
Diversification reduces risk…[because] stock price movements are not 
uniform. They are imperfectly correlated. This means that if one holds a well 
diversified portfolio, the gains in one investment will cancel out the losses in 
another. (Jonathon R. Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory , 
1991, p. 20, cited in UPIA Section 3, comment, p. 10).  
 
The exceptions to the need to diversify are also given: when tax considerations discourage it 
and when a family business is involved that the family wishes to maintain. Mutual funds are 
also mentioned as an opportunity whose advantage is in making diversification available to 
small-scale funds. 
In summary, the three model acts
2 attempt to bring the law of investment fiduciaries in 
line with modern portfolio theory that 1) matches risk-return to investor (beneficiary) 
preferences, 2)  employs diversification as a fundamental element of prudent investing, and  
3) considers all forms of investment including equities when prudent and when part of an 
 
1 All states except Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York. 
2 For information relating to the Uniform Law Commission and its acts, drafts, and   4
                                                                                                                                                                                     
overall investment strategy. The model acts reveal an increasing sophistication of state 
legislatures in matters of financial analysis. The increased financial sophistication can be 
presumed to exist not only in state legislatures, but also to extend to the bench, to the bar and 
to juries.  
 
II. Legal Background On The Forensic Economist’s Choice Of A Discount Rate 
Our concern in this paper is whether these recent “prudent investor” acts of the 
Uniform Law Commissioners may have relevance for the choice of a proper discount rate by 
forensic economists. While some argue that plaintiffs’ actual investment practices with 
respect to the awarded lump sum are irrelevant to forensic economists’ determination of 
damage awards, the language of judicial opinion clearly contemplates the investment 
dimension, both as the final step in the process of serving justice on victims, and as a logical 
and rational component of the very process of calculating the award. Judicial language from 
two leading cases is illustrative: 
We begin by recognizing that awards based on income streams spread over 
time are usually discounted to present value to account for the fact that a 
plaintiff, by receiving the money in a lump sum, “up front”, will invest the sum 
and earn additional income from the investment. [Trevino, p. 1517] 
 
…where it is reasonable to suppose that interest may safely be earned upon the 
amount that is awarded, the ascertained future benefits ought to be discounted 
in the making up of the award. [Kelly, p  .490, n20] 
 
The work of forensic economists is peculiarly situated at the margins of both legal 
theory and economic science. Perhaps it would be better to say that opinions of forensic 
economists are simultaneously shaped by law and economics. In any event, it is true that most 
practicing forensic economists, while offering scientific opinion, are nonetheless cognizant of 
 
legislation, see the organization website: http://www.nccusl.org/   5
the legal parameters. As far as can be determined, the accepted legal framework is derived 
chiefly from two legal cases: Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly [hereafter: Kelly] and 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Pfeifer [hereafter: Pfeifer]. 
A.  Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. V. Kelly 241 US 485  (1916) 
This case set forth guidelines for calculation of loss to survivors:  “…if the jury 
should find for the plaintiff they should fix the damages at such sum as would 
reasonably compensate the dependent members of Kelly’s family for the pecuniary 
loss.” (pp. 487-8)  With regard to the necessity of making one-time lump sum awards 
to replace lost earning streams, the Supreme Court advanced the law of tort damages 
into the modern era. They rejected a lower court argument that discounting to present 
value was beyond the capability of juries. They advanced the argument “that what the 
beneficiary is entitled to is not a lump sum equal to what he would receive during the 
estimated term of dependency, but the present cash value of such aggregate amount,” 
and found that instructions to discount the future wages should have been given at 
trial. The lower court had held that lost earnings are not so difficult to estimate, “and 
the average juryman is competent to compute it, but to figure interest on deferred 
payments, with annual rests, and reach a present cash value of such loss…is more than 
ought to be asked of anyone less qualified than an actuary.” (p. 489) 
The Court went on to make explicit the potential for overcompensation when 
discounting is not employed, and simultaneously made the connection between the calculation 
of present value lump sum awards and the earnings potential for the invested lump sum. 
So far as a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, it will 
afford more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits 
without taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently   6
to be awarded [emphasis added]. It is self evident that a given sum of money 
in hand is worth more than the like sum of money payable in the future. (p. 
489) 
 
The opinion also applied the established concept of mitigation to the investment of the 
awarded lump sum and held that:  “Ordinarily a person seeking to recover damages for the 
wrongful act of another must do that which a reasonable man would do under the 
circumstances to limit the amount of the damages.” (p. 489) 
The Court relied on self-interest and the reasonable man standard to predict a return to 
the invested award. 
 
...the putting out of money at interest is at this day so common a matter that 
ordinarily it cannot be excluded from consideration in determining the present 
equivalent of future payments,  since a reasonable man, even from selfish 
motives, would probably gain some money by way of interest upon the money 
recovered. (p. 490)  
 
The opinion even mentioned financial institutions and both bank deposits and municipal 
bonds as potential investments. 
Savings banks and other established financial institutions are in many cases 
accessible for the deposit of moderate sums at interest, without substantial 
danger of loss; the sale of annuities is not unknown; and, for larger sums, state 
and municipal bonds and other securities of almost equal standing are 
commonly available. (p. 490) 
 
After a clear rejection of setting the discount rate at the “legal rate of interest”, the Supreme 
Court goes on to state that: 
…it is evident that the compensation should be awarded upon a basis that does 
not call upon the beneficiaries to exercise such skill [of an experienced 
financial investor] , for where this is necessarily employed, the interest return 
is in part earned by the investor rather than by the investment. This, however,   7
is a matter that ordinarily may be adjusted by scaling the rate of interest to be 
adopted in computing the present value of the future benefits; it being a matter 
of common knowledge that, as a rule, the best and safest investments 
[emphasis added], and those which require the least care, yield only a moderate 
return. (pp. 490-1) 
 
In this passage, the Supreme Court made clear that the injured parties should not be 
expected to achieve high returns, and that safer investments will yield lower returns, but the 
Court left unresolved the tension between the two extremes of high-risk and high-return 
securities and safer but lower-yielding securities.  
Finally, regarding the scope of its own decisions, the Court denied that its purpose in 
the case was to provide a precise formula, “but merely to indicate some of the considerations 
that support the view…that  limiting the recovery to compensation requires that adequate 
allowance be made, according to circumstances, for the earning power of money.” (p. 491) 
The Kelly decision thus presents us with several of the same issues addressed in the 
model statutes relating to the investment decisions of trustees: a desire for reasonable 
compensation, the accessibility of “established financial institutions”, a variety of investment 
vehicles of reasonable security, and an over-riding goal of basing the discount rate on 
investments that can be described as “best and safest”.  
  B.  Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Pfeifer 462 US 523 (1983) 
The more recent decision in Pfeifer also touched on several key elements of the 
forensic economist’s calculation of the present value of future income streams, including 
inflation, the earnings growth rate assumption, the discount rate assumption and the type of 
investment to be used as the basis for discounting.  
With respect to inflation, the court made clear its understanding of the need for   8
consistency in the handling of inflation in the earnings growth forecast and the discount rate 
forecast. “As long as inflation continues, the amount of the ‘offset’ against the market rate 
should be chosen on the basis of the same factors that are used to estimate the lost stream of 
future earnings.” [paragraph (d), pp. 524-5]  The court demonstrated an understanding of the 
difference between real and nominal interest rates. “The relevant real interest rate is the 
difference between the short term market interest rate in a given year and the average rate of 
price inflation during that same year.” [p. 543, fn 26].   
With respect to the growth rate in earnings being forecast, the Court referred  to 
productivity increases as “a permanent feature of the national economy” and made clear that 
such increases will increase workers’ wages and should be considered in calculating the 
proper award. [p. 536] 
On page 537, the Court gave its fullest discussion of discount rates. Referring to and 
quoting liberally from the other, earlier standard citation, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Company v. Kelly, the Court wrote:  “…the ascertained future benefits ought to be discounted 
in the making up of the award.” (Kelly, p. 490). It went on to state “The discount rate should 
be based on the rate of interest that would be earned on ‘the best and safest investments’”. 
(Kelly, p. 490). The Pfeifer Court concluded that (its own words, not Kelly) the injured worker 
“is entitled to a risk-free stream of future income to replace his lost wages; therefore the 
discount rate should not reflect the market’s premium for investors who are willing to accept 
some risk of default.” (Pfeifer, p. 537).   
  At face value, the Court is holding to a presumed risk-free investment strategy that 
would preclude non risk-free investment. Yet, the Court went on to explain that the discount 
rate should reflect a rate of interest “that would be earned on ‘the best and safest investment” 
(referring again to Kelly, p. 491, at p. 537). The Court also noted that Canada uses a 7% return   9
to long-term investments minus an inflation forecast. It is also mentioned that Australia uses a 
(presumably risk-free) “2% real market rate”. [p. 541] 
After rejecting price inflation forecasts and reciting the famous quote about “not 
converting trial courts into graduate economics seminars”, the Court went on to declare that it 
is necessary to choose an appropriate below-market rate of interest, and indicated that trial 
courts using a discount rate between 1% and 3% would rarely be reversed. [p. 548] After this, 
three paragraphs later, the Court stated that, after accounting for inflation and societal factors 
affecting wage increases, “then these wage growth factors should be set off against the market 
interest rate in an estimation of future price inflation.” [p. 548] 
From the snapshot view of Pfeifer, it becomes apparent that the Supreme Court used 
the case to address several specifics relating to the forensic economists’ present value 
calculation. It is also apparent that while displaying much understanding, the Court also 
displayed some confusion and leaves a number of important issues subject to varied 
interpretation.  While at times giving instructions regarding risk-free discount rates, the Court 
also created confusion by referring to both “market” and “below-market” interest rates. At 
least one observer believes that the Court’s phrase “below-market discount rate” was simply 
an imprecise way of referring to the “net discount rate”. (Ireland, 2000, p. 55) The decision 
also created confusion by displaying both the “return on investment” and the “reduced future 
earning stream” interpretations, and by considering the cessation of income streams but not 
their possible variance.  Thus Pfeifer supports the risk-free discount rate interpretation and at 
the same time provides ample leeway for alternative interpretations as well. Insofar as it gives 
instruction regarding the predicted investment behavior of award trustees, the decision favors 
risk-free securities but leaves open the door for any securities mix that meets the ambiguous 
criteria of  “best and safest”. The “prudent investor” of the model statutes might thus be   10
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s concern with safety, so long as the level of risk assumed 
by a prudent investor is “reasonable”.  Presumably, the phrase “reasonable” in this context 
should be understood in light of modern financial and portfolio investment theory.  
 
III. Legal and Economic Perceptions of Risk    
  In one sense, the question of an appropriate discount rate for present value calculations 
in legal proceedings dissolves into a question about the proper treatment of risk. Some 
economists have simply relied on Pfeifer and similar court opinions as a legal justification for 
the use of a risk-free discount rate.  Other economists have justified the use of a risk-free 
discount rate on the basis of the economic argument that using any risk-adjusted discount rate 
in computing present value damages is equivalent to forcing a plaintiff to accept risk. As 
plaintiffs undertake any investment in non risk-free securities, their higher expected return is 
merely a compensation for the “felt” uneasiness of being forced to shoulder greater-than-zero 
levels of risk. Under this argument, a plaintiff is no better off by bearing risk. In fact, they are 
worse off and the reduction in a calculated present value lump sum due to the use of risk-
adjusted returns is a precise measure of their misfortune. The implication of this line of 
reasoning, however, is that no one is ever better off when bearing risk, a proposition that is 
clearly counterfactual.  
  To understand the risk-return tradeoff, consider Figure 1 below that illustrates the 
tradeoff between risk and return using indifference curve analysis. Since risk is a “bad” and 
return is a “good”, an indifference curve located more to the northwest would represent a 
higher level of utility for the risk-averse investor than one located more to the southeast.  The 
darker straight line represents the market’s risk/return tradeoff opportunities, exogenous to 
any investor. The three indifference curves shown depict unique risk preference profiles of   11
three risk-averse individuals with different attitudes toward risk, which we label 
“conservative,” “average,” and “aggressive.” Alternatively, the three different risk preference 
profiles could be interpreted as portraying a given individual at different ages (say 25, 45 and 
75) with attitudes toward risk derived from the time horizon of the investment activity. With 
either interpretation, an individual whose indifference curves include U1 would maximize 
utility at Point A and earn the risk-free return.  An individual whose indifference curves 
include U2, on the other hand, would maximize utility at Point B, bearing some risk to obtain 
a higher return, and an higher level of utility than the individual would gain at Point A.  
Finally, another individual whose indifference curves include U3 would maximize utility at 
Point C, bearing still more risk for a still greater return, also gaining more utility than this 
individual would gain at Point A.  Only the first of these three individuals would be worse off 
from bearing investment risk.  The other two are clearly better off. 
While there may certainly be some individuals who are risk averse to an extreme and 
who would undertake risk-free investments exclusively, there can also be little doubt that the 
median person’s attitude toward risk recognizes a tradeoff. What we observe in the 
marketplace is a variety of ideal points from lower-risk to higher-risk, with higher-risk 
solutions generally associated with longer investment horizons. 
     





If the median investor chooses to bear some risk when faced with investment options, it 
becomes difficult to state categorically that taking on risk lowers utility. Of course exposure 
to greater risk results in lower utility, ceteris paribus, but when coupled with greater return, 
greater risk to some level is desired. The optimal balance of “best” returns with “safest” 
investments will undoubtedly differ person to person. It will also differ for one person when 
considered at different points in a lifetime. The conclusion, however, that a prudent plaintiff 
upon the award of a lump sum award for injury will undertake a mixed portfolio and not rely 
exclusively on risk-free investments seems inescapable, save for the rare case of extreme risk 
aversion.  
  The several acts presented at the start of this paper repeatedly refer to a “prudent 
25/ aggressive 
0 
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75/ conservative 
45/average
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investor
3 strategy” which may entail equities as well as US Treasury securities in a diversified 
investment portfolio. Since the standard of care and of protectiveness toward the investment 
for this class of fiduciaries and trustees is very high, and since the class of retirement and trust 
funds overseen by the intended audience of these acts bears a striking resemblance to the 
lump sum award in a tort action, it is not apparent that attitudes toward risk in the several 
instances of care should be radically different.  
Historically, trustees were restricted by law to the very safest forms of investments (in 
many states trustees were limited to certain categories of securities), couldn’t delegate to 
investment specialists the oversight and direction of funds, and were prohibited from 
diversifying funds in any trust account.  Modern law surrounding trustees acknowledges 
modern portfolio theory, investment practices of diversification, and the abundance of 
financial information and expertise commonly available.  If actual practice of trustees today 
follows the clear direction of these model laws, then lump sum awards for personal injury and 
wrongful death losses will be overseen in a manner that employs the tools of modern 
investment and portfolio theory. If this is the case, then the common practice of many forensic 
economists of exclusive reliance on US Treasury bonds or bills for interest rates to be 
employed in the discounting process may be based on counterfactual assumptions. The 
practice of forensic economists may be inconsistent with both legal understanding of financial 
markets and actual investment practice. Accordingly, an assessment of the sensitivity of the 
contemplated lump sum to alternative investment scenarios is called for. 
 
3 From a legal dictionary: the prudent man rule: n. the requirement that a trustee, investment 
manager of pension funds, treasurer of a city or county, or any fiduciary (a trusted agent) must 
only invest funds entrusted to him/her as would a person of prudence, i.e. with discretion, care 
and intelligence. Thus solid "blue chip" securities, secured loans, federally guaranteed 
mortgages, treasury certificates and other conservative investments providing a reasonable 
return are within the prudent man rule. http://www.dictionary.law.com/   14
                                                
The foregoing presents an economic argument for using risk-adjusted discount rates in 
forensic economics.  It should be noted that there is an entirely different economic approach 
to this question that leads to the same conclusion.  Rather than focusing on the investment 
choices that would likely be made by a prudent investor, this alternative (but not conflicting) 
approach focuses on the fact that the future earnings stream that is to be discounted to present 
value is by no means certain to occur.  It is a well-established principle of finance that a risk-
free discount rate should be used only if the money stream to be discounted consists of 
certainty equivalents.  Since there are many reasons why an actual earnings stream might 
deviate from the expected levels (see Breeden, 2002), there is a case for incorporating these 
risks into the discount rate.  (For a thorough review of the issues, see Brush (2003.)  The main 
point to be made in the present paper is that there is economic justification for using a risk-
adjusted discount rate, even for the projection of a certain income stream.  
 
IV. Prudent Portfolios and Life-Cycle Investment Returns  
Useful information about how a “prudent investor” might invest a lump sum damage 
award can be found in the asset allocations chosen by so-called life-cycle retirement funds, 
also known as retirement target-date funds.  These mutual funds are designed to take the 
worry out of investing for retirement by automatically adjusting the asset allocation among 
stocks, bonds and money market equivalents over time.  The more distant is the retirement 
date, the more heavily the funds are invested in stocks, but as the investor moves towards the 
retirement date, there is a gradual adjustment towards a less-and-less risky portfolio. 
Table 1 gives an illustration of how life-cycle funds adjust asset allocation both before 
and after retirement.
4  With retirement 36 years away, almost 90 percent of the funds would 
 
4 The figures given are approximate averages for three life-cycle funds offered by Fidelity   15
be invested in equities, but this percentage steadily declines over time, declining to 28 percent 
approximately 9 years after retirement.
5      
 
Table 1 
Illustration of Representative Asset Allocation - Life Cycle Retirement Plans 
Years to Retirement  Investment 
Category  36 31  26  21 16  11 6  1 -4 -9 
Stocks  89% 85% 80% 75% 67% 60% 50% 44% 32% 28% 
Bonds  11% 15% 20% 25% 30% 37% 45% 49% 51% 52% 
Money* 0%  0%  0% 0% 3% 3% 5% 7% 17%  20% 
       
* money market funds, short term bond funds, etc.     
 
There is an important difference between the situation of a prospective retiree and the 
situation of a person who has received a lump sum damage award to replace future lost wages. 
 At the point of retirement, an individual’s life expectancy may still exceed 15 years
6, and 
asset allocation at that point must reflect the concern that the retirement funds will last 
through the period of retirement.  With respect to the recipient of a lump sum damage award, 
the funds are not intended to last beyond the date of retirement.  Rather, the award is intended 
to replace the individual’s lost earning capacity up to, but not beyond, the expected retirement 
date. 
The difference in the two situations just described suggests that an individual who 
must concern himself that a lump sum damage award will last until the expected retirement 
date might reasonably choose asset allocations over time that represent an approximately 15-
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Funds, Vanguard Funds, and T.Rowe Price, respectively.  There were significant differences 
among the three funds examined, with the Vanguard fund being the most conservative and the 
T. Rowe Price fund being the least conservative.  See each company’s Retirement Funds 
prospectus.  
5 For all three funds, the percentage of stocks bottoms out at 20 percent during the retirement 
years. 
6 In 2002, the life expectancy of 65-year-old males was 16.6 in the U.S. See “United States   16
year forward shift in the asset allocations that would be recommended for retirement planning. 
 In other words, the asset allocation appropriate for a prospective retiree who is 21 years from 
retirement would be appropriate for a lump sum award recipient who is 36 years from the 
target date at which the lump sum is to be exhausted, and the asset allocation for the retiree at 
the point of retirement would be appropriate for the lump sum recipient 15 years prior to 
retirement.  Table 2 makes this adaptation to the information in Table 1 to illustrate 
appropriate asset allocations for a lump sum award recipient for any period of lost wages up to 




Adaptation of Life Cycle Retirement Plan Asset Allocation 
To Economic Damage Awards 
Years to Target Date -Exhaustion of Funds    Investment 
Category  36-40 31-35 26-30  21-25  16-20  11-15  1-10 
Stocks  75% 67% 60% 50% 44% 32% 28%
Bonds  25% 30% 37% 45% 49% 51% 52%
Money 0%  3% 3% 5% 7% 17%  20%
 
To simulate the asset allocations found in the life-cycle retirement plans, we shall 
make use of simple portfolios consisting of a mix of large company stocks, intermediate-term 
government bonds, and U.S. Treasury bills to represent the stocks, bonds and money 
equivalents, respectively, found in these plans.  This approach is conservative in that the 
retirement plans include small company stocks in their portfolios (which are riskier than large 
company stocks), and also include both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Life Tables, 2002,” National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 53, No. 6, p. 9, Table 2. 
7 The asset allocations shown are conservative in that the figures for 21 years until retirement 
in Table 1 are used for years 36 through 40 rather than just year 36 in Table 2, the figures for 
16 years until retirement in Table 1 are used for years 31 through 35 in Table 2, etc.  In 
reality, the asset allocations in life-cycle funds are typically adjusted annually rather than at 5-
year intervals.   17
(which are riskier than the government bonds).    Table 3 shows the average compound annual 
returns on large company stocks, intermediate-term government bonds and U.S. Treasury bills 
over the 40-year period, 1964-2003.
8  Also shown is the average compound growth rate in 
hourly wages in the U.S. private non-agricultural economy over the same period.
9   Large 
company stocks yielded 10.6% over this period, compared to 7.72% for the government bonds 
and 6.03% for the T-Bills.  The average wage growth rate was 4.71%. 
 
Table 3 
Average Annual Compound Returns* 
and Average Compound Wage Growth Rate** 













10.61% 7.72% 6.03%  4.71% 
 
  *Source: Ibbottson Associates 2004, Table 2-5. 
**Source: Economic Report of the President, 2005, Table B-47 
 
Forensic economists often use historical averages of interest rates and wage growth 
rates to calculate a net discount rate for purposes of discounting future wage losses to present 
value.
10  If R represents the average interest rate and W represents the average wage growth 
rate, then the net discount rate is defined as  
    NDR = ((1 + R)/(1 + W)) – 1. 
If this is to be a risk-free net discount rate, then the appropriate interest rate to use is 
                                                 
8 Calculated from data in Ibbotson Associates [2004], Table 2-5. 
9 Calculated from data in Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President 
[2005], Table B-47. 
10 As recently as 1999, a survey of the members of the National Association of Forensic 
Economics indicated that this historical averages method was used by nearly half of 
practitioners, but by 2003 this percentage had slipped to 38%.  See Brookshire and Slesnick 
[1999, p. 74] and Brookshire, Luthy and Slesnick [2004, p. 33].   18
the Treasury bill rate, since T-bills are essentially free of both default risk and inflation risk.  
Given the data in Table 3, the risk-free net discount rate would be 1.26%.  The present value 
of a base annual loss of $1,000 for 40 years using the risk-free discount rate of 1.26% is 
$31,269. 
Suppose we now assume that the recipient of such a lump sum award would, in fact, 
behave as a prudent investor, following the asset allocations in Table 2 and reaping the returns 
shown for each category of investment as displayed in Table 3.  The weighted average 
portfolio returns for each five year period of a 40-year future wage loss are then shown in 
Table 4.    
 
Table 4 
Weighted Portfolio Rates of Return 
Based on Asset Allocation from Table 2 and Rates of Return from Table 3 
  Years to Target Date 
 36-40 31-35 26-30 21-25 16-20 11-15  1-10 
Rate of 
Return 
9.89% 9.61% 9.40% 9.08% 8.87% 8.36% 8.19%
 
Table 5 illustrates the extent to which overcompensation results when the lump sum 
award is derived using a risk-free discount rate but the lump sum is “prudently” invested. The 
life cycle investment returns are shown in column (2) and the constant earnings growth rate is 
shown in column (3). At the start of the first year, the individual receives the lump sum of 
$31,269, which is the beginning balance shown in the first row in column (4).  To this 
beginning balance, we add the first-year investment returns in column (5) and subtract the 
first-year wages in column (6), leaving the ending balance in column (7).  This becomes the 
beginning balance in the second year, to which second-year investment returns are added and 
from which second-year wages are subtracted, leaving an ending balance that becomes the   19
                                                
beginning balance for the third year, etc.  If prudently invested, the award of $31,269 would 
result in a remainder interest at the end of the 40
th year of $394,547.  This remainder should 
be zero. 
Table 6 illustrates the correct lump sum award that would exactly replace the lost 
future wages, assuming prudent investing of the lump sum over the entire loss period.  A lump 
sum award of $18,461 would be just large enough to cover the lost future wages and result in 
an ending balance of zero at the end of the 40
th year.
11  Thus, the lump sum award of $31,269 
represents overcompensation of 69% or $12,808. 
Tables 7 and 8 show results for a 30-year future wage loss.  The present value of a 
$1,000 annual loss for 30 years at the risk-free net discount rate of 1.26% is $24,853.  Table 7 
illustrates that an individual who receives this award and then behaves like a prudent investor 
will have a remainder of $94,055 at the end of the 30
th year instead of the anticipated zero 
balance.  Table 8 shows that the correct award under these circumstances would be $17,112.  
This is the amount that would result in a zero ending balance at the end of the 30
th year. The 
award based on the risk-free net discount rate produces overcompensation of 45% or $7,741. 
Finally, Tables 9 and 10 show results for a 20-year future loss.  The present value of a 
$1,000 annual loss for 20 years at the risk-free net discount rate of 1.26% is $17,582.  Table 9 
indicates that an individual receiving this award who subsequently behaved as a prudent 
investor would have a remainder interest of $18,028 at the end of the 20
th year.  Table 10 
indicates the correct award would be $13,991.  In this case, the award based on a risk-free net 
discount rate overcompensates the plaintiff who diversifies his investment by 26% or $4,037. 
As shown in the previous section, for all but the most risk-averse investor, bearing risk 
 
11 The “Goal Seek” function in Excel can be used to solve for the beginning balance in the 
first year that would result in a zero ending balance at the end of the 40
th year.  This is the   20
                                                                                                                                                                                     
will result in not just higher returns, but also higher utility.  Using a risk-free discount rate 
ignores this fact.  This section has demonstrated the extent to which plaintiffs might be over-
compensated through use of a risk-free discount rate when the recipient of a lump sum award 
would invest the proceeds as a “prudent investor” would.  For longer term losses, the 
overcompensation may be quite substantial. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper has presented the general outlines of a development in legal theory and practice 
that has been referred to as the “prudent investor approach” along with a sketch of its 
rationale. The goal of the prudent investor statutes is to allow the active management of trust 
funds in a manner that is consistent with modern financial (that is to say, portfolio) theory. 
  The question suggested by this development in legal thought for the forensic 
economist revolves around the discount rate. If prudent investing entails recognition of (1) the 
risk/return tradeoff, (2) the value of diversification and (3) the consideration of all forms of 
investment, including equities, then why should a risk-free rate be used to discount future lost 
earnings to present value?   As the “life cycle investment plan” scenarios demonstrate, 
significant errors in compensation can occur if tort damage awards are calculated based on 
risk-free discount rates when recipients of such awards in fact behave as prudent investors, 
gaining utility by diversifying across a range of alternative investments.  In cases of long term 
injury and the consequent extended investment time horizon, remarkably large remainder 
interests exist. For example, in the case of a 40 year future loss period, a lump sum award to 
replace a $1,000 annual earning loss that is based on an assumption of risk-free investment 
but that is invested prudently will not fully liquidate as planned. Rather, it will leave a balance 
 
correct lump sum award.  Other spreadsheet programs have similar functions.    21
at the end of the loss period of $394,547, a remarkable sum in view of the total annual loss of 
$1,000.  The legal system appears to be adjusting its dictates in light of actual financial 
practice. If the goal of forensic economists is as Trevino instructs, to compute damage awards 
that “restore the plaintiff to the position that he would have been in but for the injury”, then 
perhaps it is time as well for forensic economists to adjust their approaches to the calculation 




Illustration of Remainder Interest - 40 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 
(PV of $1,000/year for 40 Years with 1.26% Net Discount Rate = $31,269) 















40 9.89  4.71  $31,269  $3,093 $1,047  $33,314 
39 9.89  4.71  $33,314  $3,295 $1,096  $35,513 
38 9.89  4.71  $35,513  $3,512 $1,148  $37,877 
37 9.89  4.71  $37,877  $3,746 $1,202  $40,421 
36 9.89  4.71  $40,421  $3,998 $1,259  $43,160 
35 9.61  4.71  $43,160  $4,148 $1,318  $45,989 
34 9.61  4.71  $45,989  $4,420 $1,380  $49,029 
33 9.61  4.71  $49,029  $4,712 $1,445  $52,295 
32 9.61  4.71  $52,295  $5,026 $1,513  $55,808 
31 9.61  4.71  $55,808  $5,363 $1,584  $59,586 
30 9.40  4.71  $59,586  $5,601 $1,659  $63,528 
29 9.40  4.71  $63,528  $5,972 $1,737  $67,763 
28 9.40  4.71  $67,763  $6,370 $1,819  $72,313 
27 9.40  4.71  $72,313  $6,797 $1,905  $77,206 
26 9.40  4.71  $77,206  $7,257 $1,994  $82,469 
25 9.08  4.71  $82,469  $7,488 $2,088  $87,869 
24 9.08  4.71  $87,869  $7,978 $2,187  $93,661 
23 9.08  4.71  $93,661  $8,504 $2,290  $99,875 
22 9.08  4.71  $99,875  $9,069 $2,398  $106,546 
21 9.08  4.71  $106,546  $9,674 $2,511  $113,710 
20 8.87  4.71  $113,710  $10,086 $2,629  $121,168 
19 8.87  4.71  $121,168  $10,748 $2,753  $129,163 
18 8.87  4.71  $129,163  $11,457 $2,882  $137,737 
17 8.87  4.71  $137,737  $12,217 $3,018  $146,936 
16 8.87  4.71  $146,936  $13,033 $3,160  $156,810 
15 8.36  4.71  $156,810  $13,109 $3,309  $166,610 
14 8.36  4.71  $166,610  $13,929 $3,465  $177,074 
13 8.36  4.71  $177,074  $14,803 $3,628  $188,249 
12 8.36  4.71  $188,249  $15,738 $3,799  $200,188 
11 8.36  4.71  $200,188  $16,736 $3,978  $212,946 
10 8.19  4.71  $212,946  $17,440 $4,165  $226,221 
9 8.19  4.71  $226,221  $18,527 $4,361  $240,387 
8 8.19  4.71  $240,387  $19,688 $4,567  $255,508 
7 8.19  4.71  $255,508  $20,926 $4,782  $271,652 
6 8.19  4.71  $271,652  $22,248 $5,007  $288,893 
5 8.19  4.71  $288,893  $23,660 $5,243  $307,311 
4 8.19  4.71  $307,311  $25,169 $5,490  $326,989 
3 8.19  4.71  $326,989  $26,780 $5,748  $348,021 
2 8.19  4.71  $348,021  $28,503 $6,019  $370,505 
1 8.19  4.71  $370,505 $30,344  $6,303  $394,547 
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Table 6 
Correct Present Value Calculation - 40 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 















40 9.89  4.71  $18,461  $1,826 $1,047  $19,239 
39 9.89  4.71  $19,239  $1,903 $1,096  $20,046 
38 9.89  4.71  $20,046  $1,983 $1,148  $20,880 
37 9.89  4.71  $20,880  $2,065 $1,202  $21,743 
36 9.89  4.71  $21,743  $2,150 $1,259  $22,635 
35 9.61  4.71  $22,635  $2,175 $1,318  $23,492 
34 9.61  4.71  $23,492  $2,258 $1,380  $24,370 
33 9.61  4.71  $24,370  $2,342 $1,445  $25,266 
32 9.61  4.71  $25,266  $2,428 $1,513  $26,181 
31 9.61  4.71  $26,181  $2,516 $1,584  $27,113 
30 9.40  4.71  $27,113  $2,549 $1,659  $28,002 
29 9.40  4.71  $28,002  $2,632 $1,737  $28,897 
28 9.40  4.71  $28,897  $2,716 $1,819  $29,795 
27 9.40  4.71  $29,795  $2,801 $1,905  $30,691 
26 9.40  4.71  $30,691  $2,885 $1,994  $31,581 
25 9.08  4.71  $31,581  $2,868 $2,088  $32,360 
24 9.08  4.71  $32,360  $2,938 $2,187  $33,112 
23 9.08  4.71  $33,112  $3,007 $2,290  $33,829 
22 9.08  4.71  $33,829  $3,072 $2,398  $34,503 
21 9.08  4.71  $34,503  $3,133 $2,511  $35,125 
20 8.87  4.71  $35,125  $3,116 $2,629  $35,612 
19 8.87  4.71  $35,612  $3,159 $2,753  $36,018 
18 8.87  4.71  $36,018  $3,195 $2,882  $36,331 
17 8.87  4.71  $36,331  $3,223 $3,018  $36,535 
16 8.87  4.71  $36,535  $3,241 $3,160  $36,616 
15 8.36  4.71  $36,616  $3,061 $3,309  $36,368 
14 8.36  4.71  $36,368  $3,040 $3,465  $35,943 
13 8.36  4.71  $35,943  $3,005 $3,628  $35,320 
12 8.36  4.71  $35,320  $2,953 $3,799  $34,474 
11 8.36  4.71  $34,474  $2,882 $3,978  $33,378 
10 8.19  4.71  $33,378  $2,734 $4,165  $31,947 
9 8.19  4.71  $31,947  $2,616 $4,361  $30,202 
8 8.19  4.71  $30,202  $2,474 $4,567  $28,109 
7 8.19  4.71  $28,109  $2,302 $4,782  $25,629 
6 8.19  4.71  $25,629  $2,099 $5,007  $22,721 
5 8.19  4.71  $22,721  $1,861 $5,243  $19,339 
4 8.19  4.71  $19,339  $1,584 $5,490  $15,433 
3 8.19  4.71  $15,433  $1,264 $5,748  $10,948 
2 8.19  4.71  $10,948 $897  $6,019  $5,826 













Illustration of Remainder Interest - 30 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 
(PV of $1,000/year for 30 Years with 1.26% Net Discount Rate = $24,853) 
 


















30 9.40  4.71  $24,853 $2,336 $1,047 $26,142 
29 9.40  4.71  $26,142 $2,457 $1,096 $27,503 
28 9.40  4.71  $27,503 $2,585 $1,148 $28,940 
27 9.40  4.71  $28,940 $2,720 $1,202 $30,458 
26 9.40  4.71  $30,458 $2,863 $1,259 $32,063 
25 9.08  4.71  $32,063 $2,911 $1,318 $33,656 
24 9.08  4.71  $33,656 $3,056 $1,380 $35,332 
23 9.08  4.71  $35,332 $3,208 $1,445 $37,095 
22 9.08  4.71  $37,095 $3,368 $1,513 $38,950 
21 9.08  4.71  $38,950 $3,537 $1,584 $40,902 
20 8.87  4.71  $40,902 $3,628 $1,659 $42,871 
19 8.87  4.71  $42,871 $3,803 $1,737 $44,937 
18 8.87  4.71  $44,937 $3,986 $1,819 $47,103 
17 8.87  4.71  $47,103 $4,178 $1,905 $49,377 
16 8.87  4.71  $49,377 $4,380 $1,994 $51,762 
15 8.36  4.71  $51,762 $4,327 $2,088 $54,001 
14 8.36  4.71  $54,001 $4,514 $2,187 $56,329 
13 8.36  4.71  $56,329 $4,709 $2,290 $58,748 
12 8.36  4.71  $58,748 $4,911 $2,398 $61,262 
11 8.36  4.71  $61,262 $5,121 $2,511 $63,873 
10 8.19  4.71  $63,873 $5,231 $2,629 $66,475 
9 8.19  4.71  $66,475 $5,444 $2,753 $69,167 
8 8.19  4.71  $69,167 $5,665 $2,882 $71,949 
7 8.19  4.71  $71,949 $5,893 $3,018 $74,824 
6 8.19  4.71  $74,824 $6,128 $3,160 $77,792 
5 8.19  4.71  $77,792 $6,371 $3,309 $80,854 
4 8.19  4.71  $80,854 $6,622 $3,465 $84,011 
3 8.19  4.71  $84,011 $6,881 $3,628 $87,264 
2 8.19  4.71  $87,264 $7,147 $3,799 $90,612 
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Table 8 
Correct Present Value Calculation - 30 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 


















30 9.40  4.71  $17,112 $1,609 $1,047 $17,673 
29 9.40  4.71  $17,673 $1,661 $1,096 $18,238 
28 9.40  4.71  $18,238 $1,714 $1,148 $18,804 
27 9.40  4.71  $18,804 $1,768 $1,202 $19,370 
26 9.40  4.71  $19,370 $1,821 $1,259 $19,932 
25 9.08  4.71  $19,932 $1,810 $1,318 $20,424 
24 9.08  4.71  $20,424 $1,854 $1,380 $20,898 
23 9.08  4.71  $20,898 $1,898 $1,445 $21,350 
22 9.08  4.71  $21,350 $1,939 $1,513 $21,776 
21 9.08  4.71  $21,776 $1,977 $1,584 $22,168 
20 8.87  4.71  $22,168 $1,966 $1,659 $22,476 
19 8.87  4.71  $22,476 $1,994 $1,737 $22,732 
18 8.87  4.71  $22,732 $2,016 $1,819 $22,929 
17 8.87  4.71  $22,929 $2,034 $1,905 $23,058 
16 8.87  4.71  $23,058 $2,045 $1,994 $23,109 
15 8.36  4.71  $23,109 $1,932 $2,088 $22,953 
14 8.36  4.71  $22,953 $1,919 $2,187 $22,685 
13 8.36  4.71  $22,685 $1,896 $2,290 $22,292 
12 8.36  4.71  $22,292 $1,864 $2,398 $21,758 
11 8.36  4.71  $21,758 $1,819 $2,511 $21,066 
10 8.19  4.71  $21,066 $1,725 $2,629 $20,163 
9 8.19  4.71  $20,163 $1,651 $2,753 $19,061 
8 8.19  4.71  $19,061 $1,561 $2,882 $17,740 
7 8.19  4.71  $17,740 $1,453 $3,018 $16,175 
6 8.19  4.71  $16,175 $1,325 $3,160 $14,340 
5 8.19  4.71  $14,340 $1,174 $3,309 $12,205 
4 8.19  4.71  $12,205 $1,000 $3,465 $9,740 
3 8.19  4.71  $9,740 $798 $3,628 $6,910 
2 8.19  4.71  $6,910 $566 $3,799 $3,677 













    26
  
Table 9 
Illustration of Remainder Interest - 20 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 
(PV of $1,000/year for 20 years with 1.26% Net Discount Rate = $17,582) 
           















20 8.87  4.71  $17,582 $1,560 $1,047 $18,094 
19 8.87  4.71  $18,094 $1,605 $1,096  $18,603 
18 8.87  4.71  $18,603 $1,650 $1,148  $19,105 
17 8.87  4.71  $19,105 $1,695 $1,202  $19,597 
16 8.87  4.71  $19,597 $1,738 $1,259  $20,077 
15 8.36  4.71  $20,077 $1,678 $1,318  $20,437 
14 8.36  4.71  $20,437 $1,709 $1,380  $20,766 
13 8.36  4.71  $20,766 $1,736 $1,445  $21,057 
12 8.36  4.71  $21,057 $1,760 $1,513  $21,304 
11 8.36  4.71  $21,304 $1,781 $1,584  $21,500 
10 8.19  4.71  $21,500 $1,761 $1,659  $21,602 
9 8.19  4.71  $21,602 $1,769 $1,737  $21,634 
8 8.19  4.71  $21,634 $1,772 $1,819  $21,587 
7 8.19  4.71  $21,587 $1,768 $1,905  $21,450 
6 8.19  4.71  $21,450 $1,757 $1,994  $21,213 
5 8.19  4.71  $21,213 $1,737 $2,088  $20,862 
4 8.19  4.71  $20,862 $1,709 $2,187  $20,383 
3 8.19  4.71  $20,383 $1,669 $2,290  $19,763 
2 8.19  4.71  $19,763 $1,619 $2,398  $18,984 
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Table 10 
Correct Present Value Calculation - 20 Year Target Date 
Assuming Life Cycle Investment Returns 















20 8.87  4.71  $13,991 $1,241 $1,047 $14,185
19 8.87  4.71  $14,185 $1,258 $1,096  $14,347
18 8.87  4.71  $14,347 $1,273 $1,148  $14,471
17 8.87  4.71  $14,471 $1,284 $1,202  $14,553
16 8.87  4.71  $14,553 $1,291 $1,259  $14,585
15 8.36  4.71  $14,585 $1,219 $1,318  $14,486
14 8.36  4.71  $14,486 $1,211 $1,380  $14,317
13 8.36  4.71  $14,317 $1,197 $1,445  $14,069
12 8.36  4.71  $14,069 $1,176 $1,513  $13,732
11 8.36  4.71  $13,732 $1,148 $1,584  $13,295
10 8.19  4.71  $13,295 $1,089 $1,659  $12,725
9 8.19  4.71  $12,725 $1,042 $1,737  $12,030
8 8.19  4.71  $12,030 $985 $1,819  $11,196
7 8.19  4.71  $11,196 $917 $1,905  $10,209
6 8.19  4.71  $10,209 $836 $1,994  $9,050
5 8.19  4.71  $9,050 $741 $2,088  $7,703
4 8.19  4.71  $7,703 $631 $2,187  $6,147
3 8.19  4.71  $6,147 $503 $2,290  $4,361
2 8.19  4.71  $4,361 $357 $2,398  $2,320
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